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In March 2020, the U.S. economy saw an unprecedented
increase in the number of layoffs and discharges due to the
outbreak of the COVID-19 virus. Over 11 million American
workers were displaced—a 670 percent increase compared
to the same month the previous year. The unemployment rate
rose quickly and was recorded at an all-time high of 14.7
percent in April 2020. Not only is displacement a traumatic
event in and by itself, but it also has been shown to lead to
significant and even permanent losses for workers in terms
of future earnings, employment, wages, health, and mortality
(Sullivan and von Wachter 2009). Furthermore, the large and
potentially permanent negative consequences from job loss
obviously puts a massive strain on public expenditures in
terms of providing unemployment benefits, health care, and
social assistance.
This thesis consists of four self-contained essays devoted
to the topic of job loss, its consequences for individual
workers, and how related labor market polices could be used
and affect subsequent labor market outcomes for workers.
The first essay studies the short- and long-run consequences
of job loss for individual workers and explores why and
under what circumstances the cost of displacement are most
persistent. In the second essay, which is joint work with Peter
Fredriksson, Arash Nekoei, and David Seim, we examine
the effects of advance notice of job loss and how such notice
affects the labor market prospects for workers. The third
essay, coauthored with Martin Söderström and Johan
Vikström, empirically analyzes the importance of caseworkers at the Public Employment Service. Here we examine
not only caseworker value-added but also which features of
a caseworker are important for job seeker outcomes and to
what extent job seeker–caseworker matching matter. The
fourth and final essay of this thesis examines a 30-week
unemployment benefit extension and studies how the extension affects both benefit and unemployment duration, as well
as the hazard to employment.

Essay 1
Saved by Seniority—Effects of Displacement
for Workers at the Margin of Layoff
A large literature documents that displaced workers suffer
significant and even permanent losses in terms of their future
earnings, employment, and wages. Since the seminal study
by Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993), the literature has
relied on comparisons of displaced vis-à-vis nondisplaced
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high-tenured workers, using mass layoffs or plant closures
as an exogenous source of variation. However, most job loss
occurs because of more marginal adjustments to employment. Strikingly, between 2003 and 2012, only about 8 percent of all involuntary separations in the United States were
due to mass layoffs, many of which also involved lowertenured workers.1 Meanwhile, little is known to what extent
the results from mass layoffs generalize to less drastic and
more regular adjustments to employment, or if extraordinary
events render extraordinary consequences for workers?
The first essay of this thesis studies the short- and longrun consequences of job loss for workers and explores why
and under what circumstances the cost of displacement is
most persistent. This is done using a novel source of identification, exploiting the use of a last-in-first-out (LIFO)
rule used in layoffs in Sweden. The LIFO rule mandates
that workers should be laid off in inverse order of seniority,
whereby more recent hires ought to be let go before workers
with higher tenure. Using detailed matched employeremployee data, containing information on job start and end
dates, I rank workers according to their relative seniority
(tenure) within an establishment which, by the LIFO rule,
renders variation in the probability of displacement. Combining these data with a unique individual register dataset
containing all layoff notifications involving at least five
workers during 2005–2015, I identify occupation-specific
cutoffs in downsizing establishments where the probability
of displacement jumps discontinuously. This lends itself
to a (fuzzy) regression discontinuity (RD) design, where
the discontinuities enable me to go beyond standard mass
layoff estimates and study earnings, employment, and wage
losses for a broader and more representative population of
workers who are laid off because of less drastic and more
regular adjustments to employment. Exploiting the large
heterogeneity across layoffs, I also pool different thresholds
and separately estimate earnings losses and its persistence by
worker characteristics and the size of layoff to investigate the
key drivers of permanent earnings losses.
The main finding is that both the composition of workers
and the size of the layoff have important consequences for
how workers are affected by job loss, particularly in the long
run. My estimates indicate that displaced workers on average
suffer initial earnings losses of about 38 percent compared to
their nondisplaced coworkers. While not being fully comparable, the size of these initial losses is close to what has been
observed for displaced workers in the United States who are
laid off during recessions (Davis and von Wachter 2011). As
time progresses, however, the earnings gap between displaced and nondisplaced workers shrinks and is fully closed
seven years after displacement. Crucially, this is not driven
by the nondisplaced workers getting laid off at a later point
in time. I also decompose cumulative earnings losses into
different margins of adjustment and show that these losses
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are primarily driven by lower wages and less employment,
whereas the hours responses are of lesser importance.
My finding that earnings losses are transitory rather
than persistent stands in contrast to the previous literature,
which finds long-run earnings losses ranging between 10
and 20 percent of previous earnings. I make use of the large
heterogeneity across layoffs to understand the main drivers
of long-run earnings losses. I begin by estimating earnings
losses of displaced workers using mass layoffs following
the standard event study approach. I find large and highly
persistent effects of displacement, thus ruling out that the
transitory pattern observed in the RD analysis is context
or time specific. I then proceed by producing separate RD
estimates for each layoff. I correlate the short- and the longrun losses with characteristics of the workers, occupation,
and establishment involved in the layoff, as well as economic
conditions at the time of notification. While I find that older
workers are more negatively affected by job loss, the key
driver of persistent earnings losses turns out to be the relative
size of the layoff. In fact, significant persistence can only be
found among establishments executing mass layoffs, that is,
those that displace more than 30 percent of their workforces.
This pattern remains even when controlling for worker characteristics and economic conditions. Going further, I exploit
the fact that there is variation in the size of the layoff relative
to the local labor market, holding constant the layoff size in
relation to the establishment. These estimates indicate that
the key determinant of persistent earnings losses is the size
of the layoff in relation to the local labor market, suggesting
that negative spillovers and labor congestion play an important role for workers’ future labor market outcomes.
To my knowledge, this is the first study to exploit seniority rules as an exogenous source of variation to involuntary job loss. Relative to the previous literature estimating
earnings losses upon displacement, the findings shed new
light on the question of how workers are affected by job loss
and whether displacement creates lasting scars or merely
temporary blemishes. Whereas previous literature suggests
the former, my results indicate that while this may be true for
high-tenured workers displaced under a mass layoff, earnings
losses are temporary and transitory when considering more
regular and less drastic adjustments to employment. These
results may have important implications for both targeting
and shaping of public policy.
The findings in this paper also speak to the theoretical literature explaining the observed earnings losses of displaced
workers in models featuring search frictions, unemployment fluctuations, and job ladders (see, e.g., Ljungqvist and
Sargent [1998]; Davis and von Wachter [2011]; Krolikowski
[2017]; Kuhn and Jung [2019]). Many of the standard models of the labor market have trouble generating the magnitude
and persistence of empirically observed losses or disagree
on its sources (Davis and von Wachter 2011; Carrington and
Fallick 2017). My results suggest that the way for a mecha-
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nism generating long-run persistence at the individual level
has been overemphasized in the theoretical literature.

Essay 2
How Does Advance Layoff Notice Affect the
Labor Market Prospects for Workers?
(with Peter Fredriksson, Arash Nekoei, and David Seim)
Layoff rules are sometimes criticized for hampering
the speed of adjustment after adverse shocks and creating
inefficiencies in the allocation of resources. However, layoff
rules also provide insurance for workers in part by mandating that firms share information on future reductions in labor
demand, and they may force firms to share the costs associated with layoff.
The second essay in this thesis examines how advance
layoff notice affects the labor market prospects for workers.
More precisely, we utilize quasi-random variation in the
length of notice periods to estimate the effects of advance
notice on exposure to nonemployment, job mobility, subsequent wages, and earnings. The quasi-random variation
comes from collective bargaining agreements, which stipulate that individuals above a certain age get longer notice
periods. We estimate the causal effects of longer advance
notice in a regression discontinuity design.
Employment protection legislation in most countries
features advance layoff notice. The length of the notice
period typically increases with tenure and tends to be longer
for white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers. Notice
periods are also longer in Northern and Continental Europe
than in Anglo-Saxon countries (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2013). In the United
States, labor laws do not feature notice periods in the case of
individual dismissals, but in the case of plant closures and
mass layoffs, legislation sometimes mandates that workers
are given two months of notice.
Contracts may also provide employment protection and
advance notice. In the United States, for example, collective bargaining agreements often include notice periods and
severance pay. Such agreements provide workers with extra
protection relative to the law. In the Swedish context, the law
provides a set of default rules, and the provisos in the collective agreements provide workers with additional protection.
Previous empirical analyses of employment protection
originate from the seminal work of Lazear (1990). Using a
panel of OECD countries, Lazear (1990) finds that severance pay increases unemployment. In a different panel of
countries, Heckman and Pagés (2004) document a negative
association between job security provisions and employment
rates. Another strand of the literature exploits policy reforms
to obtain quasi-experimental effects of employment pro-
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tection on various outcomes. Kugler and Pica (2008) show
that mandated severance pay reduces employment in Italy,
while Autor, Kerr, and Kugler (2007) find similar effects on
employment from increased dismissal costs.
We contribute to this literature along two margins. First,
the employment outcomes in previous studies originate from
both hiring and separations margins. By focusing on separations, we specifically investigate the role of advance notice
for a laid-off worker, thereby uncovering the insurance role
of such employer protection legislation. Second, our setting provides the ideal testing ground from an identification
perspective. We exploit exogenous variation in the length
of advance notice within establishments and displacement
events, across individuals. This permits a compelling analysis of the causal effects of advance notice.
We also contribute to an older literature, which investigates the role of advance notice for laid-off workers using
the Displaced Worker Survey (see Ruhm [1992, 1994] and
the survey in Addison and Blackburn [1994]). That literature
exploits cross-sectional variation in advance notice periods
instigated by the Worker Assistance and Retraining Notification Act and finds that joblessness falls upon notification of
job loss. Our paper breaks new ground by providing quasi-experimental variation applied to administrative data on
long-term outcomes.
Advance notice policies are clearly related to severance
pay and unemployment insurance policies. Pissarides (2001)
analyzes a model where firms can offer severance pay and
advance notice as part of an optimal contract, but unemployment insurance (UI) is exogenously set by the government.
His analysis implies that optimal contracts are more likely to
involve severance pay or advance notice when UI replacement rates are low. In his model, advance notice plays a
role over and above severance payments if and only if the
insurance properties are sufficiently superior.2
Our empirical work relates to the model in Pissarides
(2001) in the sense that we think of (voluntary) severance
pay as an outcome of other policy parameters, in our case
mandatory advance notice. We examine whether firms are
willing to make—and whether workers accept—an up-front
severance payment in order to avoid the notice period. To
our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides such an
analysis.
The major results of the paper are the following. Longer
notice periods cause prolonged periods of adjustment. For
workers who are eligible for a longer notification period (the
treatment group), the probability of remaining in the displacing firm increases during the first two years after notification,
and the probability of moving to another firm falls during the
same time period. As a result of an extension of the notice
period, workers are less exposed to unemployment and
nonemployment and spend less time outside the labor force.
After two years, all employment responses have subsided
and there are no differential effects on employment outcomes

9

for the treatment and control groups. We also show that the
treatment group experiences smaller wage losses when finding a new job than the control group: wages in new jobs are
3 percent higher for the treatment group than for the control
group. Moreover, firms make severance payments to workers
in order to avoid the notice period: the extra payment accruing to the treatment group amounts to almost 60 percent of
the monthly wage. Finally, we show that workers who are
eligible for higher UI get lower severance payments. This is
consistent with the view that they are more willing to accept
lower severance pay since they have a better outside option
should they leave the firm for unemployment.
The extra severance payment is part of the overall effect
on earnings for treated workers. When we decompose the
earnings effect accruing to workers during the first two years
after notification, we find that around half of the earnings
effects has to do with less exposure to nonemployment and a
third is due to the increase in severance pay. The wage effect
amounts to a fifth of the overall earnings effect. Over time,
the wage effect becomes less important as individuals with
short notification periods—who initially find a lower-quality
job—move on to better-paying jobs at a greater rate than
individuals with long notification periods.

Essay 3
What Makes a Good Caseworker?
(with Martin Söderström and Johan Vikström)
Countries around the world use job search assistance,
monitoring schemes, and labor market programs to try to
bring unemployed workers back to work. By now, there is
extensive evidence on these policies (see, e.g., Card, Kluve,
and Weber [2010, 2017]). However, much less is known
about the caseworkers who provide the job search assistance,
carry out the monitoring, and assign job seekers to programs
(see the literature review below and McCall, Smith, and
Wunsch [2016]). This is unfortunate, since a comprehensive
picture of labor market policies requires that we understand
the role of the human resources used to provide the services.
It is, for example, important to know who becomes a caseworker, why some caseworkers perform better than others,
and for whom caseworkers matter the most. While these are
important questions, the evidence is scarce for two important
reasons. First, in most cases, there is nonrandom sorting of
job seekers to caseworkers, often because the most productive caseworkers are assigned the most disadvantaged job
seekers. Second, high-quality data on caseworkers is often
lacking. Usually, data do not link caseworkers to job seekers,
and in the rare cases when such information is available,
typically little is known about the caseworkers.
In the third essay of this thesis, we address both of these
issues. First, we break the caseworker–job seeker sorting by
2020 Dissertation Summaries

exploiting that many local employment offices in Sweden
use date-of-birth-rules to allocate job seekers to caseworkers,
creating as-if random allocation. Second, we have access to
uniquely fine-grained information on caseworkers, such as
labor market experiences and cognitive ability, and we can
link job seekers to caseworkers. The quasi-random allocation
and the fine-grained data allow us to provide new and credible evidence on the importance of caseworkers and what
makes a good caseworker.
In Sweden, employment services are provided by caseworkers at local public employment offices. These offices
have extensive discretion to design the rules for allocating
job seekers to caseworkers. It turns out that many offices use
job seekers’ date of birth (day in the month) to allocate them
to caseworkers. We exploit that the day in the month you are
born (1st to 31st) is uncorrelated with individual characteristics. Thus, if job seekers are allocated to caseworkers using a
date-of-birth rule, this creates as-if random allocation, since
all caseworkers within a local office will have job seekers
with similar observed and unobserved characteristics.
Our analysis shows that even within the offices that use
a date-of-birth allocation rule, some job seekers are not
allocated using the rule. Some offices make exemptions
for special groups, such as youths, disabled workers, or
immigrants, and allocate these groups to caseworkers who
are believed to be able to provide the best support to them.
Since these exemptions may introduce sorting, we use an
IV-framework exploiting that we can identify the caseworker
each job seeker would have had if they had been allocated
using the date-of-birth rule. This rule-predicted caseworker is
then used as an instrument for the caseworker assigned to the
job seeker. This identification strategy adds to the existing
literature on caseworkers, which mainly includes studies
based on conditional independence assumptions, assuming
that the allocation of job seekers to caseworkers is random
conditional on observed job seeker characteristics (see, e.g.,
Lechner and Smith [2007]; Behncke, Frölich, and Lechner
[2010a,b]; Arni, van den Berg, and Lalive [2017]; Arni and
Schiprowski [2019]). One recent exception, however, is
Schiprowski (2020), who exploits unplanned absences to
study the effects of a meeting with a caseworker and to study
productivity differences across caseworkers. Our paper uses
detailed data on caseworkers and the date-of-birth allocation
to provide more comprehensive evidence on caseworker
performance.
Our unique administrative data on caseworkers include
rich measures of labor market history, such as information on
previous occupations and personal experience with unemployment. For most male caseworkers, we also have information on cognitive and noncognitive ability from enlistment
tests. Staff records provide information on experience (tenure
at the public employment service) and wages for each caseworker. To this, we add information on demographics such as
gender, level and type of education, and country of origin.
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Using the fine-grained caseworker data, we initially
study who becomes a caseworker. One conclusion is that
caseworkers in Sweden are a heterogeneous group that
includes former blue-collar workers; individuals with
university degrees in social work, business economics, and
human relations; and both natives and nonnatives. Interestingly, caseworkers have, on average, lower cognitive skills,
substantially more experience of unemployment, but similar
noncognitive skills as other public sector employees with
similar types of occupations.
We then study caseworker performance in three different
parts. In the first part, we analyze how different observed
caseworker characteristics are related to caseworker performance as measured by the reemployment rate among their
job seekers. Even though we are able to study a heterogeneous group of caseworkers, few observed caseworker
characteristics predict caseworker performance. The most
important characteristic is the gender of the caseworker: job
seekers with female caseworkers have 3.1 percent shorter
unemployment durations than those with a male caseworker.
There is also some evidence that caseworkers with higher
wages perform better, but this may, of course, reflect both
that high-performing caseworkers are rewarded with higher
wages and that higher wages motivate caseworkers to perform better. However, many other caseworker characteristics,
such as type of education, level of education, experience
from previous occupations, and personal experience with
unemployment are not related to caseworker performance.
These results are consistent with results from the teacher
literature, which finds little evidence of a relationship
between teacher quality and observed teacher characteristics
(Rockoff 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005; Rockoff
et al. 2011). Moreover, caseworkers with higher cognitive
ability do not perform better than low-ability caseworkers.
There is, however, some suggestive evidence indicating that
caseworkers with higher noncognitive ability may have a
positive impact on job seekers’ job-finding rates early on in
the unemployment spell.
Based on the actions taken by the caseworkers, we also
examine caseworker traits. Inspired by Arni, van den Berg,
and Lalive (2017), we define “supportive” caseworkers as
those who more often use supportive actions, such as sending
their job seekers to labor market training, whereas “restrictive” caseworkers are those who more often use restrictive
policies such as workfare. Furthermore, we define “active”
caseworkers as those who more frequently meet with their
job seekers. Our results show that active caseworkers perform better than other caseworkers. This adds to the rather
few existing studies: Arni, van den Berg, and Lalive (2017)
find that caseworkers who emphasize support have better
outcomes, while Behncke, Frölich, and Lechner (2010b)
show that tougher caseworkers are more successful than
supportive ones.
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The second part of the paper examines caseworker–job
seeker matching and focuses on caseworker–job seeker similarity, since it has been argued that sharing the same social
background can enhance communication and trust. This is
also what we find. Being assigned a caseworker with the
same gender leads to a higher job-finding rate, but it is not
the case that immigrant caseworkers provide better support
to immigrants. Using our fine-grained data, we are also the
first to show that matching job seekers to caseworkers with
similar labor market experiences and/or similar educational
background leads to substantially shorter unemployment
durations. Besides improved communication and trust, this
may also reflect that experience from working in the same
sector as the job seeker enables caseworkers to understand
the individual-specific labor market opportunities, and that
caseworkers can use their social networks to help job seekers
with similar labor market experiences.
The third and final part of the paper examines the overall importance of caseworkers by estimating caseworker
fixed effects. This takes into account differences due to both
observed and unobserved caseworker characteristics. The
overall conclusion is that there are economically important
differences between caseworkers. A one standard deviation
increase in the distribution of caseworker fixed effects not
only increases the job-finding rate among the job seekers
by around 0.1 standard deviation but also renders about 5
percent higher earnings after three years. This confirms that
caseworkers indeed can affect how quickly job seekers get
back to work, a result consistent with Schiprowski (2020). It
is also in line with the results from other economic contexts;
a large literature has documented substantial differences
in teacher quality (Rockoff 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, and
Kain 2005; Rothstein 2010; Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff
2014a,b), and several studies have shown that managers
matter for firm policies and firm performance (Bertrand and
Schoar 2002; Bloom et al. 2014; Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton
2015).

Essay 4
Extended Unemployment Benefits and the
Hazard to Employment
How does the generosity of UI affect job search behavior? While providing a safety net for unexpected job loss,
the provision of UI creates disincentives for job search by
lowering the alternative cost to working. The question of
how benefit levels and their overall generosity affects time
in, and the hazard out of, unemployment has a long tradition in labor economics and has been subject to extensive
research. The “spike” in the hazard rate out of unemployment coinciding with UI exhaustion is a widely established
empirical result since the seminal work by Katz and Meyer
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(1990a,b). This result generally has been attributed to
shirking behavior among job seekers, holding off finding
a new job until approaching benefit exhaustion. However,
later work by Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) challenges this
view by attributing the lion’s share of such spikes to flight
out of the labor force. They argue that “spikes are generally smaller when the spell length is measured by the time
to next job than when it is defined by the time spent on the
unemployment system” (p. 1). Hence, “ . . . the size of the
spike in re-employment rates at exhaustion in the current
U.S. labor market (and many other labor markets) remains
an open question. Further work on estimating these hazards
using administrative measures of time to next job would be
particularly valuable” (p. 16). Indeed, if benefit exhaustion
renders job seekers to leave the labor force, the expected cost
of extending UI benefits could be exaggerated if transition to
work is higher from unemployment than nonemployment.
This paper contributes to the debate about the timing
of reemployment and UI exhaustion while adding to the
large literature on the effects of UI on job search behavior.
In particular, I examine the effect on unemployment duration, and exit to employment, of an exogenous 30-week
UI benefit extension in Sweden. For identification, I take
advantage of a feature in the Swedish UI system that entitles
individuals with a child below the age of 18 to 90 weeks of
unemployment benefits instead of the statutory 60 weeks. As
assignment to the extended UI benefit is determined by the
age of a job seekers’ youngest child at the time of regular UI
exhaustion (60 weeks), I exploit the quasi-experimental variation generated around the age threshold using a regression
discontinuity design. This allows me to estimate the causal
effect of increasing potential duration of UI on actual benefit
duration, unemployment duration, and hazard to employment. Further, I allow the effects to vary with duration on
UI and in unemployment to test whether job seekers time
employment to benefit extension.
The main findings are threefold. First, while the increase
in potential duration on UI increases actual duration on UI by
about 2.7 weeks on average, I find no evidence of it prolonging duration in registered unemployment or negatively
affecting the hazard to employment. This suggests that the
30-week benefit extension did not prolong average unemployment duration, as job seekers were unemployed just as
long on average but with a somewhat higher replacement
rate. The absence of negative effects on unemployment duration and future employment is believed to be driven by job
seekers’ access to fairly generous post-UI programs, which
weakens the disincentive effects of the benefit extension.
Second, being eligible to 30 additional weeks of UI does
not appear to have affected job search behavior prior to the
actual extension period. That is, I find no evidence of job
seekers lowering their search efforts due to the anticipation
of extended benefits. Third, I find distinct spikes in the exit
from UI at benefit exhaustion, but no such spikes are present
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in the hazard to employment. This therefore speaks in favor
of the interpretation made in Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007).
Notes
1. Calculations are based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics by combining data from the Mass Layoff Statistics program
(which ended in March 2013) with the Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey. That survey reports the total number of layoffs
and discharges, which is made up of all involuntary separations initiated by the employer. Both these data sources can be
accessed at http://www.bls.gov.
2. A severance payment is a pure transfer from the worker to the
firm and thus does not affect the private surplus of the match. By
contrast, advance notice may have a negative effect on the private
surplus if the match is kept alive after it has become unproductive. These costs have two components: first, there may be
variable costs associated with keeping an unproductive job alive;
second, for the worker-firm pair, unemployment income is a pure
subsidy that is forgone by keeping the match alive. In the framework of Pissarides (2001), the insurance value of advance notice
must thus outweigh these losses relative to the severance pay.
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